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The Boston Public School Match
By ATI ˙LA ABDULKADI ˙ROG ˘LU,P ARAG A. PATHAK,A LVIN E. ROTH, AND TAYFUN SO ¨NMEZ*
After the publication of “School Choice: A
Mechanism Design Approach” by Abdulkadiro-
g ˘lu and So ¨nmez (2003), a Boston Globe re-
porter contacted us about the Boston Public
Schools (BPS) system for assigning students to
schools. The Globe article highlighted the dif-
ﬁculties that Boston’s system may give parents
in strategizing about applying to schools.
Brieﬂy, Boston tries to give students their ﬁrst-
choice school. But a student who fails to get her
ﬁrst choice may ﬁnd her later choices ﬁlled by
students who chose them ﬁrst. So there is a risk
in ranking a school ﬁrst if there is a chance of
not being admitted; other schools that would
have been possible had they been listed ﬁrst
may also be ﬁlled.
Valerie Edwards, then Strategic Planning
Manager at BPS, and her colleague Carleton
Jones invited us to a meeting in October 2003.
BPS agreed to a study of their assignment sys-
tem and provided us with micro-level data sets
on choices and characteristics of students in the
grades at which school choices are made (K, 1,
6, and 9), and school characteristics. Based on
the pending results of this study, the Superin-
tendent has asked for our advice on the design
of a new assignment mechanism. This paper
describes some of the difﬁculties with the cur-
rent mechanism and some elements of the de-
sign and evaluation of possible replacement
mechanisms.
School choice in Boston has been partly shaped
by desegregation. In 1974, Judge W. Arthur
Garrity ordered busing for racial balance. In
1987, the U.S. Court of Appeals freed BPS to
adopt a new, choice-based assignment plan. In
1999 BPS eliminated racial preferences in as-
signment and adopted the current mechanism.
I. The Current Boston Mechanism
BPS has over 60,000 students from grades
K–12 in almost 140 schools in three zones:
East, West, and North. During the ﬁrst registra-
tion period in January, students who will be
entering a new school in grades K, 1, 6, and 9
are asked to rank at least three schools in order
of preference. Although most assignments are
made in the ﬁrst registration period, Boston has
other registration periods in February, March,
and April.
For elementary and middle school, parents
are asked to consider schools in their zone plus
ﬁve schools open to all neighborhoods. High
school admissions are city-wide for 18 schools.
There are also 13 high schools that require
special admissions and three special-education
programs that are not part of the centralized
allocation process.
In 2004, at the end of the ﬁrst registration
period, there were about 4,800 students entering
kindergarten, 4,000 entering grade 1, over 4,300
students entering grade 6, and about 4,000 en-
tering grade 9.
Boston assigns students if possible to their
ﬁrst-choice school, allocating over-demanded
seats by a system of priorities. First, a younger
sibling has priority to attend the same school as
an older sib. Next in priority for half of each
program’s seats are students from the school’s
walk zone. Not every residential location in the
city has a school for which they obtain walk-
zone preference. Students who live in these
locations are then given priority for assignment
to their ﬁrst- and second-choice schools. Addi-
tional priorities are assigned by random num-
bers generated once for each student. After the
ﬁrst registration period there is no longer a
walk-zone priority.
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numbers determine a strict priority order. Each
school has a maximum capacity determined by
BPS. The Boston mechanism assigns students
as follows:
Step 1.—For each school, consider the students
who have listed it as their ﬁrst choice and
assign seats to these students in priority order
until either no seats remain or no student
remains who has listed it as ﬁrst choice.
Step k.—For each school with seats still avail-
able, consider the students who have listed it
as their kth choice and assign seats to these
students in priority order until either no seats
remain or no student remains who has listed
it as kth choice.
The procedure terminates when each student is
assigned a seat (or all submitted choices are
considered).
If a student does not get her top choice, she
may be added to a school’s waiting list. Stu-
dents who get their second choice go on the
wait-list for their ﬁrst choice. Students who get
neither their ﬁrst nor second choice are placed
on wait-lists for both. Students who do not get
any of their choices go on wait-lists for up to
three choices. The priority on the wait-list is
based on sibling preference, round of applica-
tion, and random number. When the school year
starts, if a student leaves the public-school sys-
tem, the student may no longer stay on a wait-
list. All wait-lists expire in January of the next
school year.
During the 2002–2003 assignment process,
about 11 percent of students were on wait-lists.
In 2004, two major changes were introduced:
caps to the size of the wait-list and active con-
ﬁrmation of interest in a wait-list. This year,
students may go on wait-lists only until the
wait-list contains 25 percent of the number of
seats at the grade level in the school. Also,
students already on the number of wait-lists
they are entitled to according to the school
choice they received must leave one list before
being added to another.
At the end of the assignment process, if a
student is not given any of his choices, or did
not return an application, BPS assigns the stu-
dent to the school closest to home that has
space.
The Boston mechanism is a priority matching
mechanism (Roth, 1991). Priority mechanisms
have been used to match medical graduates to
internships in several regions of the United
Kingdom, starting in the 1960s. Each of these
mechanisms was abandoned after being gamed
by the participants. Yan Chen and So ¨nmez
(2005) experimentally examine preference ma-
nipulation under the Boston mechanism and
observe the associated welfare loss.
Priority mechanisms are common in school
choice. The largest district we know of with a
priority mechanism is Hillsborough County
School District in Tampa-St. Petersburg, the
11th largest school district in the United States,
with about 170,000 students.
1 Cambridge, Den-
ver, Minneapolis, and Seattle also have priority
mechanisms.
The idea that students and parents should be
cautious in choosing their ﬁrst choice is in-
cluded in the reference material provided to
students and parents. BPS states “for a better
chance of getting your ‘ﬁrst choice’ school
... consider choosing less popular schools” (In-
troducing Boston Public Schools, 2004, p. 3
[quotation marks in original]). In Seattle and
Tampa-St. Petersburg, the incentives for such
preference manipulation are advocated in the
local press (see Haluk Ergin and So ¨nmez,
2005). Note that when students rank less com-
petitive programs ﬁrst, many get their stated
ﬁrst choice. Approximately 80 percent of stu-
dents who submit preferences in the ﬁrst regis-
tration period get their stated ﬁrst choice in
Boston. Of course, this is not necessarily their
most preferred school.
II. Two Alternative Matching Mechanisms
It is costly in the Boston mechanism to list a
ﬁrst-choice that you do not succeed in getting
because, once other students are assigned their
ﬁrst-choice places, they cannot be displaced
even by a student with higher priority. A class
of mechanisms that avoid this are deferred-
acceptance algorithms (David Gale and Lloyd
Shapley, 1962) of the kind adopted by New
1 Often, the precise allocation rules are not publicly
speciﬁed by the school districts.
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2005) and elsewhere (Roth, 2002):
Step 1.—Each student “proposes” to her ﬁrst
choice. Each school tentatively assigns its
seats to its proposers one at a time in their
priority order. Any remaining proposers are
rejected.
Step k.—Each student who was rejected in the
previous step proposes to her next choice if
one remains. Each school considers the stu-
dents it has been holding together with its
new proposers and tentatively assigns its
seats to these students one at a time in priority
order. Any remaining proposers are rejected.
The algorithm terminates when no student pro-
posal is rejected, and each student is assigned
her ﬁnal tentative assignment.
In contrast with the Boston algorithm, the
deferred-acceptance algorithm assigns seats
only tentatively at each step, so students with
higher priorities may be considered in subse-
quent steps. Consequently it is stable in the
sense that there is no student who loses a seat to
a lower-priority student and receives a less-
preferred assignment. Moreover all students
prefer their outcome to any other stable match-
ing (Gale and Shapley, 1962), and the induced
student-optimal stable mechanism is dominant-
strategy incentive-compatible (Roth, 1982a).
(Unlike in New York City, the schools are not
strategic players in Boston, as the priorities are
set centrally.) If the intention of the school
board is that priorities be “strictly enforced,”
this mechanism is a leading candidate.
However, if welfare considerations apply
only to students, there is tension between sta-
bility and Pareto optimality (Roth, 1982a). If
priorities are merely a device for allocating
scarce spaces, it might be possible to assign
students to schools they prefer by allowing them
to trade their priority at one school with a stu-
dent who has priority at a school they prefer.
The following top trading cycles (TTC) mech-
anism creates a virtual exchange for priorities:
Step 1.—Assign counters for each school to
track how many seats remain available. Each
student points to her favorite school, and each
school points to the student with the highest
priority. There must be at least one cycle. (A
cycle is an ordered list of distinct schools and
students (student 1 - school 1 - student 2 - ... -
student k - school k) with student 1 pointing
to school 1, school 1 to student 2, ... , student
k to school k, and school k pointing to student
1.) Each student is part of at most one cycle.
Every student in a cycle is assigned a seat at
the school she points to and is removed. The
counter of each school is reduced by 1, and if
it reaches zero, the school is removed.
Step k.—Each remaining student points to her
favorite school among the remaining schools,
and each remaining school points to the stu-
dent with highest priority among the remain-
ing students. There is at least one cycle.
Every student in a cycle is assigned a seat at
the school she points to and is removed. The
counter of each school in a cycle is reduced
by 1, and if it reaches zero, the school is
removed.
The procedure terminates when each student is
assigned a seat (or all submitted choices are
considered).
This version of the TTC mechanism was in-
troduced by Abdulkadirog ˘lu and So ¨nmez
(2003) and is an extension of Gale’s “top trad-
ing cycles mechanism” described in Shapley
and Herbert Scarf (1974). Many properties of
TTC carry over to school choice, including Pa-
reto efﬁciency (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) and
dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (Roth,
1982b). Variations of this procedure can also be
considered which may reduce instability (e.g.,
Onur Kesten, 2005). See also the recent design
of a kidney exchange clearinghouse (Roth et al.,
2004, 2005).
III. Design Considerations
Unlike in New York (Abdulkadirog ˘lu et al.,
2005), students’ priorities at schools are not set
by schools, but by the central administration.
There does not seem to be any issue of individ-
ual schools gaming the system in Boston.
Therefore, it is natural to ask whether the ben-
eﬁts that “stable” matching produces in New
York have parallel beneﬁts in the different sit-
uation in Boston, and if not, whether the welfare
improvements that might be available from a
TTC-like mechanism should be considered.
At a public meeting of the Boston School
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advice about how to think about this. We re-
plied with the question “Would anyone mind if
two students who each preferred the school in
the other student’s walk zone were to trade their
priorities and enroll in those schools?” If this is
not desirable (e.g., because of transportation
costs, or because walk-zone priorities reﬂect a
public good that results when parents walk chil-
dren to school, or because lawsuits might follow
if a child is excluded from a school while an-
other with lower priority is admitted), then sta-
ble matchings would efﬁciently combine
student preferences with priorities. But if help-
ing the students this way is worth whatever
transportation and other costs might be in-
curred, then only the students’ preferences need
to be taken into account and a TTC-like mech-
anism might be more appropriate.
IV. Recent Developments
In December 2003, the Boston School Com-
mittee initiated an evaluation of all aspects of
student assignment. The ﬁnal task-force report
recommends changing the student assignment
algorithm. The task force observed that, even
though students can select three schools, many
children do not get any of their picks because, if
a parent and student choose three popular
schools and do not get their ﬁrst choice, they
may also miss their second and third choice.
A memorandum from Superintendent Payzant
in December 2004 states that BPS plans to
change the computerized process used to assign
students to schools. Although the task-force re-
port recommended that BPS adopt the TTC
assignment algorithm, the School Committee is
interested in simulations of both mechanisms
and in understanding the extent of preference
manipulation under the Boston mechanism.
They are also thinking through their philosoph-
ical position on the trade-off between stability
and efﬁciency.
REFERENCES
Abdulkadirog ˘lu, Atila; Pathak, Parag A. and
Roth, Alvin E. “The New York City High
School Match.” American Economic Review,
2005 (Papers and Proceedings), 95(2), pp.
364–67.
Abdulkadirog ˘lu, Atila and So ¨nmez, Tayfun.
“School Choice: A Mechanism Design Ap-
proach.” American Economic Review, 2003,
93(3), pp. 729–47.
Chen, Yan and So ¨nmez, Tayfun. “School Choice:
An Experimental Study.” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 2005 (forthcoming).
Ergin, Haluk and So ¨nmez, Tayfun. “Games of
School Choice under the Boston Mecha-
nism.” Journal of Public Economics, 2005
(forthcoming).
Gale, David and Shapley, Lloyd. “College Ad-
missions and the Stability of Marriage.”
American Mathematical Monthly, 1962,
69(1), pp. 9–15.
Kesten, Onur. “Student Placement to Public
Schools in the US: Two New Solutions.”
Mimeo, University of Rochester, 2005.
Roth, Alvin E. “The Economics of Matching:
Stability and Incentives.” Mathematics of
Operations Research, 1982, 7(4), pp. 617–
28.
Roth, Alvin E. “Incentive Compatibility in a
Market with Indivisible Goods.” Economics
Letters, 1982b, 9(2), pp. 127–32.
Roth, Alvin E. “A Natural Experiment in the
Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets:
Regional Markets for New Physicians and
Surgeons in the United Kingdom.” American
Economic Review, 1991, 81(3), pp. 414–40.
Roth, Alvin E. “The Economist as Engineer:
Game Theory, Experimental Economics and
Computation as Tools of Design Econom-
ics.” Econometrica, 2002, 70(4), pp. 1341–
78.
Roth, Alvin E.; So ¨nmez, Tayfun and U ¨nver, M.
Utku. “Kidney Exchange.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 2004, 119(2), pp. 457–88.
Roth, Alvin E.; So ¨nmez, Tayfun and U ¨nver, M.
Utku. “A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in
New England.” American Economic Review,
2005 (Papers and Proceedings), 95(2), pp.
376–80.
Shapley, Lloyd and Scarf, Herbert. “On Cores
and Indivisibility.” Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 1974, 1(1), pp. 23–28.
371 VOL. 95 NO. 2 PRACTICAL MARKET DESIGN